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Abstract: In the literature on assertion, there is a common assumption that having the 
knowledge that p is a sufficient condition for having the epistemic right to assert that p – 
call this the Knowledge is Sufficient for Assertion Principle, or KSA. Jennifer Lackey has 
challenged KSA based on several counterexamples that all, roughly, involve isolated 
secondhand knowledge. In this article, I argue that Lackey’s counterexamples fail to be 
convincing because her intuition that the agent in her counterexamples both has knowledge 
and do not have the epistemic right to assert is wrong. The article will progress as follows: 
In section 1, I present Lackey’s argument. In section 2, I suggest some more general reasons 
for doubting that the agent in her counterexamples actually has knowledge. I then show 
that from a virtue theoretic and Edward Craig’s practical explication of knowledge 
perspectives the agent in Lackey’s counterexamples does not know. Since the agent in 
Lackey’s counterexamples does not have knowledge, she has failed to convincingly prove 
that KSA is false. In section 3, I conclude by suggesting that, at most, what Lackey’s 
counterexamples demonstrate is a problem with a simplistic evidentialist and/or process 
reliabilist epistemology. 
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Introduction 
In the literature on assertion, there is a common assumption that having the knowledge 
that p is a sufficient condition for having the epistemic right to assert that p – call this the 
Knowledge is Sufficient for Assertion Principle, or KSA.1 Recently, Jennifer Lackey has 
challenged KSA based on several counterexamples that all, roughly, involve isolated secondhand 
knowledge. In this article, I argue that Lackey’s counterexamples fail to be convincing because 
                                                 
1 For example, DeRose (2002), Hawthorne (2004), Simion (2016), amongst others, can all be seen as either 
advocating or sympathetic to something like KSA.  
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her intuition that the agent in her counterexamples both has knowledge and does not have the 
epistemic right to assert is wrong. 
Lackey is correct that the agent in her counterexamples does not have the epistemic right 
to assert, but part of the reason that they do not have that right is because the agent does not, in 
fact, have knowledge. In other words, the reason that Lackey’s agent does not have the epistemic 
right to assert is in part because KSA, or something like it, holds. However, it is not just that I do 
not share Lackey’s intuitions – which I do not. It will be shown that for a variety of reasons, and 
according to different epistemological theories, the agent does not have knowledge. 
This article will progress in the following way. In section 1, I present Lackey’s argument. 
In section 2, I suggest some more general reasons for doubting that the agent in her 
counterexamples actually has knowledge. I then show that from a virtue theoretic and Edward 
Craig’s practical explication of knowledge perspectives the agent in Lackey’s counterexamples 
does not know. Since the agent in Lackey’s counterexamples does not have knowledge, she has 
failed to convincingly prove that KSA is false. In section 3, I conclude by suggesting that, at 
most, what Lackey’s counterexamples demonstrate is a problem with a simplistic evidentialist 
and/or process reliabilist epistemology. 
 
1. Lackey’s Argument 
According to what has been identified in this article as KSA: If a subject S knows that p, 
then S has the epistemic right to assert that p. (Lackey 2011, 252).2 To be clear, KSA in its most 
                                                 
2 What I have identified as KSA, is Lackey’s second formulation of the sufficient condition of the Knowledge Norm 
of Assertion (KNA-S*). “KNA-S*: One is properly epistemically positioned to assert that p if one knows that p. 
According to the KNA-S*, then, knowledge is sufficient for possessing the epistemic authority for assertion” 
(Lackey 2011, 252). KSA simply cashes out “possessing the epistemic authority for assertion” as the epistemic right 
to assert. Similarly, Simion (2016, 3043) refers to it as the sufficiency claim for a Knowledge Norm of Assertion 
(KNA-Suff) and words it as follows: “One’s assertion that p is epistemically proper if one knows that p.” KSA is 
just clarifying “epistemically proper”. 
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general form simply maintains that knowledge is sufficient for the epistemic right to assert. KSA 
does not require one to assert, and there may be additional norms governing assertion. For 
example, a psychiatrist, over the course of many therapeutic sessions, comes to know that her 
client, Tom, is an alcoholic; the norms governing doctor-patient privilege prevent the psychiatrist 
from asserting what the psychiatrist knows to certain people. However, the psychiatrist would 
not be epistemically blameworthy for asserting that Tom is an alcoholic. 
Even though Lackey admits that there is some intuitive plausibility and, potentially, some 
theoretical power behind KSA, she argues that KSA is actually false. She suggests “that there are 
various kinds of cases in which a speaker asserts that p, clearly knows that p, and yet does not 
have the proper epistemic authority or credentials [i.e. the epistemic right] to make such an 
assertion, thereby showing that knowledge is not always sufficient for epistemically proper 
assertion” (Lackey 2011, 253). Lackey makes her case through a series of counterexamples that 
all involve isolated secondhand knowledge.3 For simplicity, I will focus, predominately, on one 
of Lackey’s counterexamples that she calls DOCTOR. 
DOCTOR: Matilda is an oncologist at a teaching hospital who has been 
diagnosing and treating various kinds of cancers for the past fifteen years. One of 
her patients, Derek, was recently referred to her office because he has been 
experiencing intense abdominal pain for a couple of weeks. After requesting an 
ultrasound and MRI, the results of the tests arrived on Matilda’s day off, 
consequently, all of the relevant data were reviewed by Nancy, a competent 
medical student in oncology training at her hospital. Being able to confer for only 
a very brief period of time prior to Derek’s appointment today, Nancy 
communicated to Matilda simply that her diagnosis is pancreatic cancer, without 
offering any of the details of the test results or the reasons underlying her 
conclusion. Shortly thereafter, Matilda had her appointment with Derek, where 
she truly asserts to him purely on the basis of Nancy’s reliable testimony, “I am 
very sorry to tell you this, but you have pancreatic cancer” (Lackey 2011, 253). 
 
                                                 
3 What Lackey means by “isolated secondhand knowledge” will become clear as I explicate her view, below. 
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The first thing Lackey draws one’s attention to is that in DOCTOR Matilda’s knowledge 
is isolated and secondhand. It is isolated because the only thing that Matilda “knows” is simply 
the fact that Derek has cancer – Matilda’s general background knowledge regarding cancer, 
generally, and the little information she has from her previous meeting with Derek is not 
significant enough to un-isolate her knowledge. Matilda’s knowledge is secondhand because the 
only reason she “knows” is based exclusively on another person’s – viz. Nancy’s – testimony. 
There is nothing inherently wrong with isolated secondhand knowledge4; it is just that in 
DOCTOR it leads to problems. 
Lackey maintains “that Matilda clearly knows that Derek has pancreatic cancer – it is 
true, she believes it, she has good reason to trust the testimony of her medical student, and Nancy 
is in fact a reliable source” (Lackey 2011, 254). Further, according to Lackey, it is clear that 
Matilda does not have the epistemic right to simply assert to Derek that he has pancreatic cancer. 
There are several reasons that Lackey gives to justify her claim that Matilda lacks the epistemic 
right to assert. Matilda is an expert oncologist and this expertise carries with it certain epistemic 
duties and responsibilities to fulfill before asserting a diagnosis. These duties and 
“responsibilities may include having reviewed the test results firsthand, possessing reasons for 
choosing one condition over another, knowing details about the size and nature of the cancer, 
and so on” (Lackey 2011, 254). Further, as an expert it is expected that Matilda should be able to 
justify and explain her diagnoses, in general, and Derek’s cancer diagnosis, in particular. Such 
justification and explanation is impossible for Matilda given the isolated secondhand knowledge 
involved. 
                                                 
4 An example of unproblematic isolated secondhand knowledge is Lackey’s own Chicago visitor case. See Lackey 
(2007). 
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Based on the considerations regarding DOCTOR, Lackey concludes DOCTOR is “a case 
where a speaker knows that p without thereby being epistemically positioned to assert that p, 
thereby falsifying [what Lackey refers to as] KNA-S*” (Lackey 2011, 258). In the terminology 
being used in this article, DOCTOR demonstrates that one can know that p, but lack the 
epistemic right to assert that p, thereby falsifying KSA. More explicitly, Lackey’s argument 
amounts to this: 
1) If KSA is true, then if one knows that p, then one has the epistemic right to assert that p. 
2) In DOCTOR: One knows that p, but does not have the epistemic right to assert that p. 
3) Therefore, KSA is not true. (by 1, 2 and Modus Tollens) 
 
2. Problems with Lackey’s Argument 
Lackey’s argument is simple and straightforward. If she is right, then she has identified a 
huge problem with much of the literature on assertion.5 In this section of the article, I argue that 
premise 2 of Lackey’s argument does not hold, and thus she fails to demonstrate that KSA is 
false. I will show that in DOCTOR6 it is not the case that an agent both knows and lacks the 
epistemic right to assert. 
Although Lackey claims that it is “clear” that Matilda knows Derek has cancer, it 
certainly does not seem clear that Matilda knows. Further, although Lackey gives some reasons 
for thinking that Matilda does know Derek has cancer – viz. “it is true, she believes it, she has 
good reason to trust the testimony of her medical student, and Nancy is in fact a reliable source” 
                                                 
5 See for example, DeRose (2002), and if one takes assertion to be a kind of action, see Hawthorne and Stanley 
(2008). 
6 Again, I will only be primarily arguing against Lackey’s counterexample DOCTOR. Although she gives several 
counterexamples that she thinks refute KSA, they are all roughly the same. They all involve what she calls isolated 
secondhand knowledge and are cases where, purportedly, the agent involved has knowledge but lacks the epistemic 
right to assert. The reasoning I will use to refute DOCTOR, I think can be extended to all her cases. Thus, for 
brevity, I have only focused on the one counterexample. 
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– she is really just trading in intuitions (Lackey 2011, 254). It is obvious that she is merely 
appealing to intuition when she considers some modified versions of her counterexample and 
states that one can “compar[e] the intuitions elicited from such modified cases with those from 
the original” (Lackey 2011, 256). 
Considering DOCTOR from the perspective of a variety of epistemological theories – 
e.g., Craig’s practical explication of knowledge, virtue epistemology, inferentialism – it will be 
shown that Matilda does not actually know Derek has cancer. If Matilda does not know that 
Derek has cancer, then Lackey’s counterexample fails, and thereby her argument that KSA is 
false does not go through. Moreover, though it was not gone into above, Lackey gives reasons to 
justify here claim that Matilda lacks the epistemic right to assert. What is interesting is her 
reasons for claiming that Matilda lacks the epistemic right to assert – such as the increased 
epistemic duties tied to Matilda’s status as an expert oncologist and her inability to provide a 
justification for the diagnosis – are actually reasons to think Matilda does not know. Thus, 
Lackey is implicitly appealing, in part, to KSA, or something like it, in here counterexample. 
The advantage of demonstrating that Matilda fails to have knowledge for a variety of 
reasons is that it will block a couple of responses that Lackey could make. Such responses would 
amount to something like this: On the one hand, “I disagree that your general reasons hold,” and 
on the other hand “Well sure according to theory X Matilda does not have knowledge, but I have 
independent reasons for thinking theory X is false, therefore it has not been shown that Matilda 
does not have knowledge, really.” I will be considering DOCTOR in a variety of ways. First, I 
will give some more general reasons for doubting that Matilda has knowledge. Then I will show 
that from the perspectives of virtue theoretic account of knowledge and Craig’s practical 
explication of knowledge Matilda does not know that Derek has cancer. Even if Lackey has 
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independent reasons for rejecting all the considerations put forward, it seems hard to believe that 
if all of these reasons and theories point to the fact that Matilda lacks knowledge in DOCTOR 
that Matilda would have knowledge. At the very least the onus would be on Lackey to do more 
work to prove that Matilda does have knowledge – i.e. more than the few off hand reasons she 
does give, and her intuitions. 
 
2.1. Why Lackey’s Agent Fails to Have Knowledge 
Before turning to Craig and virtue epistemology, in this sub-section I will suggest some 
reasons for thinking that the agent in Lackey’s counterexample does not actually have the 
purported knowledge that Lackey thinks the agent does. Importantly, part of my reasoning for 
claiming that the agent does not know is similar to Lackey’s justification for claiming that the 
agent does not have the epistemic right to assert. 
So first, in DOCTOR, consider the content of what is to be known – viz. that Derek has 
pancreatic cancer – especially since Matilda is an expert oncologist it is not a straightforward 
proposition like “grass is green”, or “a square has four sides”. Like cancer itself, the content of 
the belief is complex and multifaceted,7 in fact that is why multiple tests are run before a 
diagnosis can be made. Saying that an oncologist knows someone has cancer is not to say that 
the oncologist knows the truth-value of a simple proposition. Thus, at least prima facie, Matilda 
does not actually know that Derek has cancer. The reason she does not know is because all that 
the reliable testimony of Nancy conveys to Matilda is, at best, the vague understanding that there 
                                                 
7 This same type of issue holds for Lackey’s other counterexamples as well. For example, when one is speaking to 
the quality of a restaurant, or a student’s writing ability, these are things that are multifaceted and complex, not 
simple propositions (Lackey 2011). 
 8 
 
is something like pancreatic cancer present in the patient Derek, and, at worst, simply the truth-
value of a statement. 
Cancers are unique. They come in stages, involve different types of tumors, can be more 
or less deadly, sometimes they run the danger of spreading, and sometimes not. In order to really 
know, Matilda needs to know what Derek’s cancer is. Nancy’s testimony does not speak to that. 
Therefore, based simply on Nancy’s testimony Matilda simply cannot know Derek has cancer 
because she does not know what Derek’s cancer is. Lackey, inadvertently, draws attention to the 
issue under consideration here when, in justifying why Matilda lacks the epistemic right to 
assert, she states that “Matilda should be able to (at least partially) explain or justify the 
diagnosis of pancreatic cancer that she is offering to her patient” (Lackey 2011, 254). One way to 
understand the explication or justification of the diagnosis is to see it as explaining what the 
diagnosis is. In other words, to explain a diagnosis is to fill out the content of the proposition 
“Derek has pancreatic cancer.” 
Another way to think about what Lackey is saying when she is denying that Matilda lacks 
the epistemic right to assert is that she is, implicitly, appealing to a principle that is even stronger 
than KSA. The reason that Matilda lacks the epistemic right to assert is because she does not 
know what she is asserting. Matilda cannot explain or justify the assertion that Derek has 
pancreatic cancer because she does not know that he has cancer. That is to say, one has the 
epistemic right to assert only if one knows – i.e. knowing that p is necessary in order to have the 
epistemic right to assert that p. The fact that Matilda cannot explain or justify the diagnosis 
underscores the fact that she does not know what she is purportedly diagnosing, which, in turn, 
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explains the impropriety of asserting the diagnosis. If that is right, then KSA has not been 
refuted, because Matilda does not know.8 
A further issue is that it seems that the evidence needed to ground knowing that Derek 
has cancer needs to be fairly significant, especially considering Matilda is an expert oncologist. 
Again, Lackey draws attention to this increased demand for evidence. Being an oncologist 
carries with it “certain epistemic duties. … [T]hese responsibilities may include having reviewed 
the test results firsthand, possessing reasons for choosing one condition over another, knowing 
details about the size and nature of the cancer, and so on” (Lackey 2011, 254). Lackey believes 
that the aforementioned epistemic duties relate only to assertion. However, they seem much 
more like evidential requirements on knowledge, on the one hand – reviewing test results, 
possessing reasons. On the other hand, “knowing details about the size and nature of the cancer” 
speaks to not only the evidential requirements but also the previous issue about the complexity of 
what is involved in a doctor knowing that someone has cancer (Lackey 2011, 254). 
While the above considerations are not definitive, they are at least some prima facie 
reasons for doubting that the agent in Lackey’s counterexamples, in general, and Matilda in 
DOCTOR, in particular, does actually have the knowledge required for her argument to work. I 
now turn to another consideration that suggests that it is far from clear that Matilda knows that 
Derek has cancer. What was argued above basically amounts to the fact that doctors need 
stronger justification than the word of a student – no matter how reliable it might be – to make a 
diagnosis. Thus, isolated secondhand testimony is insufficient for Matilda to know that Derek 
has cancer. More obviously, however, is the fact that Matilda is unable to make the same 
                                                 
8 My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for drawing attention to the fact that I might not have been clear on this 
point. What I am suggesting is that because KNA-N fails in the case means that Matilda does not have knowledge, 
which means that DOCTOR is not a case where the agent has knowledge but lacks the right to assert and eo ipso 
means KSA is not refuted. 
 10 
 
appropriate inferences from the reliably produced testimony of Nancy, which she would be if she 
actually knew that Derek had cancer – from looking at test results and so forth. 
Imagine that when Matilda tells Derek he has cancer and he starts asking her questions: 
“Is his case terminal, is he going to need surgery or chemotherapy or both, how large is the 
tumor, is there a danger of the cancer spreading?” Based on Nancy’s testimony, Matilda cannot 
answer any of these questions. The reason she is unable to answer the questions is because she 
really does not know that Derek has cancer. In fact, the most natural response to Derek’s 
questions would be for Matilda to say “I don’t know”, and the reason she does not know the 
answers to his questions is because she does not really know he has cancer. Matilda may have a 
true belief based on Nancy’s testimony, but one of the things that makes knowledge more 
valuable than mere true belief is the ability to make appropriate inferences. 
Lackey implicitly relies on these inferential considerations in a similar example in order 
to argue that someone similarly situated to Matilda lacks the epistemic right to assert. Lackey 
states: 
Suppose, for instance, that he asks [Matilda] what exactly the ultrasound and MRI 
revealed, or how large his tumor is, or why she thinks it is pancreatic cancer. All 
she can say … is that she had been told that he has pancreatic cancer … that she 
hadn’t actually seen any of the test results herself, and that she has no additional 
information to offer about his particular diagnosis. Wouldn’t [Derek] be entitled 
to resent [Matilda] under such circumstances, to feel that he has been 
epistemically cheated by his doctor who owes him more than a diagnosis 
grounded purely in isolated secondhand knowledge (Lackey 2013, 38)? 
 
What the above quote suggests is a few things; first, it underscores what was said above 
regarding the justification, and evidence, needed for a doctor to know someone has cancer. 
Second, it suggests that part of Derek’s resentment involves Matilda’s inability to make 
appropriate inferences based on Nancy’s testimony. Finally, the reason that Derek is entitled to 
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feel “epistemically cheated” is not merely because Matilda lacks the epistemic right to assert, 
but, more importantly, the information that Matilda is conveying to Derek does not meet the 
standards for knowledge. Derek is being cheated because Matilda is trying to pass off true belief 
as knowledge – i.e. Matilda is giving Derek something less epistemically valuable (a true belief) 
when what he deserves is something more epistemically valuable (knowledge). 
Now one could possibly object by claiming something along the lines that DOCTOR is a 
peculiar case because of the context or stakes involved raises the demands for knowledge. 
However, even in low-stakes scenarios Matilda still does not know that Derek has cancer, based 
solely on Nancy’s testimony. Later in her paper, in responding to possible objections to her 
thesis Lackey gives the following modified DOCTOR case. “Suppose, for instance, that instead 
of flat out asserting to Derek that he has pancreatic cancer in DOCTOR, she [Matilda] casually 
asserts this fact to her husband over dinner” (Lackey 2011, 272).9 
Lackey thinks that in the modified DOCTOR case that Matilda actually has knowledge 
and the epistemic right to assert – at least intuitively. If what I have been arguing thus far is right, 
though, even when talking to her husband, Matilda still does not know. Imagine that when 
Matilda mentions Derek’s cancer to her husband, he says to her “Is there anything you’ll be able 
to do for him?” Matilda will be forced to answer “I don’t know”, because even in that context 
Matilda does not really know that Derek has cancer. Even if the low-stakes lowers the evidential 
requirements, the fact that she is unable to draw appropriate inferences is enough to justify the 
claim that Matilda does not know even when talking to her husband. 
 
                                                 
9 Certainly, it would be inappropriate for Matilda to tell her husband that Derek had cancer based on the norms 
governing doctor-patient privilege. However, as I mentioned above those norms are not of concern for this article – 
only the epistemic norms governing assertion are of concern here. 
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2.2. Edward Craig and Virtue Epistemology 
Having given some more general reasons for doubting that the agent in Lackey’s 
counterexamples does, in fact, have knowledge, I now turn to some more theoretical 
considerations. It seems that a virtue theoretic account of knowledge and Edward Craig’s 
practical explication of knowledge give one reason to think that the agent in Lackey’s 
counterexamples does not know what is being asserted.10 Again, for simplicity, I will focus on 
DOCTOR. However, the same reasoning can be applied to her other cases. 
 
2.2.1. Virtue Epistemology 
According to John Greco on a virtue theoretic account of knowledge 
S knows that p if and only if 
1. p is true; 
2. S believes that p; and 
3. S believes the truth because S’s belief is produced by intellectual ability. (Greco 2010, 
12). 
It seems that Matilda, in DOCTOR, does not satisfy all three of these conditions. Even if 1 and 2 
are granted, it does not seem that 3 is satisfied.11 In a sense, Matilda’s intellectual abilities are 
                                                 
10 This line of argument is not definitive, but it does the work that it is supposed to do. For Lackey’s counterexample 
to work it needs to be the case that it is obvious that Matilda has knowledge but lacks the right to assert. Presenting 
multiple theories that would indicate that Matilda does not have knowledge switches the burden to Lackey to explain 
why, beyond the intuition. Of course, one might disagree with Greco or Craig, but that is actually fine. Simply the 
existence of such theoretical accounts undermine Lackey’s claim. My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing 
out that my argumentative strategy might not have been clear on this point. The same reviewer also pointed out that 
from the perspective of “speech-act theory” there is something odd about Lackey’s counterexample. As I am 
unfamiliar with the particulars of the theory, I have decided to leave considerations of that perspective to someone 
better suited to the task. 
11 I am not even sure that 1 and 2 are satisfied because of what was said above about the complexity of knowing 
something like someone has cancer. However, even granting 1 and 2 still does not get Matilda knowledge. 
Therefore, I will focus on 3. 
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involved – e.g. her ability to hear. However, on a virtue theoretic account it is not simply that any 
intellectual ability needs to be involved in order to attain knowledge, but the relevant intellectual 
ability needs to be involved in the right way. 
In order to clarify 3, and why Matilda has not satisfied it, consider that 3 really amounts 
to something more like this: “when we attribute knowledge to someone we mean to give the 
person credit for getting things right. Put another way, we imply that the person is responsible 
for getting things right” (Greco 2003, 111).12 In other words, in order to be attributed knowledge 
one has to have done something creditworthy, or one has to have done something that makes one 
responsible for having the true belief. What creditworthiness, and responsibility, amount to can 
of course vary. However, it does not seem that Matilda has done anything creditworthy, nor is 
she really responsible for having a true belief regarding Derek’s cancer.13 
If anyone deserves credit, it would be Nancy. Nancy used her excellent visual, reasoning 
and other abilities in deciding that Derek has pancreatic cancer. Those are the type of abilities 
relevant for a cancer diagnosis. Matilda used no abilities like that; she simply believed what 
Nancy told her. Thus, Matilda is neither creditworthy nor responsible for the true belief, and 
therefore does not have knowledge. 
To underscore the point that Matilda is neither creditworthy nor responsible reduce 
Nancy’s reliability for cancer diagnosis. Even if it is intuitively plausible that Matilda could have 
knowledge based on Nancy’s highly reliable testimony, as one reduces Nancy’s reliability there 
will come a point where Matilda does not have knowledge. Further, other than a naïve 
evidentialist, that point will probably far exceed a .5 probability.14 Here is the idea. Nancy’s 
                                                 
12 Emphasis added. 
13 Again, it is not even clear to me that Matilda has a true belief, but, for the sake of argument, it will be granted. 
14 Actually, to me even 100% reliability would not meet the standards necessary. For precisely the reasons which 
will be explained. 
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testimony is too unstable to transfer credit or responsibility to Matilda. If Nancy’s testimony is 
too reliable, the credit that accrues to Nancy will swamp any credit that could be assigned to 
Matilda. If Nancy’s testimony is too unreliable, then a true belief is not transferred at all. 
More importantly, what the variability of Nancy’s reliability illustrates, is precisely what the 
relevant abilities are, and how a doctor can be responsible for knowing someone has cancer. 
When Nancy is highly reliable it is because of her education, specialized visual abilities needed 
for reviewing test results and excellent reasoning abilities, for example. When Nancy is less 
reliable, it is because those same abilities are not as good. Further, when Nancy is less reliable 
one does not give credit to Matilda because Matilda did not exercise the abilities – education, 
visual and reasoning abilities – and in fact would be blamed for not using them. By the same 
reasoning then, even when Nancy is highly reliable, Matilda does not deserve credit nor is she 
responsible precisely because Matilda did not exercise the relevant abilities. 
Another way to think about the issue under consideration here – that Matilda is not 
creditable – is to note that Matilda’s abilities are not a salient part of the causal story leading to 
the true belief. Greco discusses two ways that something can be a salient part of the causal story. 
Only one of which is relevant here. According to Greco, a “major factor governing salience is 
our interests and purposes” (Greco 2003, 118). The interests and purposes involved in a cancer 
diagnosis, predominately, all relate to knowing what to do with the diagnosis. Based on what was 
said above regarding Matilda’s inability to make appropriate inferences, and Derek feeling 
epistemically cheated, it seems clear that Matilda’s abilities – e.g. hearing – do not serve the 
relevant interests and purposes. 
Alternatively, and relatedly, one can think of the creditability along more Sosaian lines 
and see that Matilda is not creditable because she has not manifested her abilities qua oncologist 
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(Sosa 2007). Remember that Matilda is an expert oncologist giving a cancer diagnosis. 
Therefore, even if Matilda has a true belief her coming to hold that true belief does not manifest 
her abilities. It does not manifest her abilities because, on the one hand, the nature of what is to 
be known, demands certain abilities – like the ones mentioned above – and, on the other hand, it 
does not manifest her abilities as an expert oncologist. Thus, again, Matilda is not creditable for 
the true belief, and therefore does not have knowledge. 
Finally, consider Linda Zagzebski’s virtue epistemology. Unlike Greco and Sosa who 
understand epistemic virtues more along the lines of a type of reliabilism – i.e. cognitive abilities 
like reasoning, and perception – Zagzebski understands virtues more along the lines of traditional 
virtue ethics, and she refers to them as “intellectual virtues”. Intellectual virtues are motives or 
dispositions like intellectual courage – standing by one’s beliefs – intellectual humility – being 
open to contrary evidence – and so forth. For Zagzebski, “[k]nowledge is belief arising out of 
acts of intellectual virtue” (Zagzebski 1999, 109). In DOCTOR, Matilda, by basing her diagnosis 
on Nancy’s testimony, was exercising a kind of intellectual vice – something like intellectual 
laziness. Thus, Matilda fails to know that Derek has pancreatic cancer if knowledge is 
understood along Zagzebski’s line because her belief did not arise out of an act of intellectual 
virtue. In fact, Matilda’s belief arose out of an act of intellectual vice, which explains, in part, 
why Derek would feel epistemically cheated. 
 
2.2.2. Edward Craig and the Practical Explication of Knowledge 
Having discussed why Matilda fails to have knowledge according to a virtue theoretic 
account of knowledge, I now turn to Edward Craig’s practical explication of knowledge. 
According to Craig, “the concept of knowledge is used to flag approved informants” (Craig 
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1986-7, 215). While that is Craig’s, so to say, definition of knowledge, what is helpful for 
present purposes is “that the principal candidates [for] the analysis of the everyday concept of 
knowledge all lie very close to the concept constructed by adopting the point of view of the 
inquirer” (Craig 1986-7, 225). 
By adopting the point of view of the inquirer, if one wants to know whether Matilda 
knows Derek has pancreatic cancer, then one needs to adopt Derek’s perspective. Fortunately, 
Lackey has explained what Derek’s perspective is, or would be. 
Derek reasonably has the right to expect his doctor to fulfill such a duty [viz. 
reviewing test results firsthand, possessing reasons for choosing one condition 
over another, knowing details about the size and nature of the cancer]. … 
Wouldn’t Derek be entitled to resent Matilda under such circumstances [i.e. not 
fulfilling here epistemic duties], to feel that he has been epistemically cheated by 
his doctor who owes him more than a diagnosis grounded purely in isolated 
secondhand knowledge (Lackey 2011, 6-7). 
 
The issues in the above quote have been discussed already, but Craig gives them some more 
theoretical substance. 
If one, again, imagines that Derek begins asking Matilda questions about the diagnosis, 
and Matilda is unable to respond, at first, Derek would probably be a bit confused. Matilda then 
“reveals to Derek that she had been told that he has pancreatic cancer from her student Nancy, 
that she hadn’t actually seen any of the test results herself, and that she has no additional 
information to offer about his particular diagnosis” (Lackey 2011, 6). It seems the most natural 
response that Derek might give – beyond resenting Matilda and feeling epistemically cheated – 
would be something like: “So, you really don’t know I have cancer. Your student believes I may 
have cancer. That’s what you’re telling me.” 
What Craig’s practical explication of knowledge gives is yet another reason to doubt that 
Matilda both has knowledge and lacks the epistemic right to assert. By adopting the perspective 
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of the inquirer, namely Derek, it becomes abundantly clear that what is epistemically 
problematic in DOCTOR is the fact that Matilda is asserting something she does not know, as if 
she does know it. It is not, as Lackey maintains, merely that Matilda lacks the epistemic right to 
assert – which she does – but the reason why she lacks the epistemic right to assert is, in part, 
that KSA, or something like it, holds and Matilda lacks knowledge. At a minimum, the way 
Lackey explains the fact Matilda lacks the epistemic right to assert seems much more like she is 
explaining why Matilda does not know, but if that is right then she clearly has not shown that 
KSA is false. 
A further implication of Craig’s view is that knowledge flags good informants for 
actionable information.15 Thus, part of the problem in DOCTOR is that merely asserting to 
Derek that he has pancreatic cancer is not an actionable piece of information. He does not know 
if he needs more tests, or needs to start taking medicine, or change his diet, or prepare for 
surgery. What would make the information actionable is answers to the types of questions he 
would ask that Matilda cannot answer. Therefore, yet again, in order to know Matilda would 
have to have looked at the test results and so forth, in order to make the information she was 
asserting actionable for Derek, and thereby knowledge on her part. 
All of the considerations put forth in section 2 may not, individually, tell against 
Lackey’s counterexamples.16 However, by taking everything together it seems clear that the 
assertor in Lackey’s counterexamples does not actually have knowledge, and therefore does not 
disprove KSA.17 Lackey is correct that the assertor in her counterexamples lacks the epistemic 
                                                 
15 John Greco has brought this to my attention. 
16 I actually think many of them do, but the strength of the argument against Lackey is the force of everything taken 
together. 
17 Recall that I have focused on DOCTOR for simplicity. The same reasoning here can equally applied to all of her 
counterexamples. 
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right to assert, but she is wrong about why they lack that right. It is unclear why Lackey would 
think they do not have the epistemic right to assert, but the real reason is, in part, because of 
KSA, or something like it, and the fact that the assertor does not know what they are asserting. 
Still, even if Lackey is not relying implicitly on KSA it does not seem that she has shown that 
KSA is false. 
 
2.3. A Fall Back Position 
All the reasons discussed above seem to point to the fact that the agent in Lackey’s 
counterexamples does not have knowledge, demonstrating that Lackey has failed to disprove 
KSA. However, some still might not think that anything that has been said actually proves that 
the agent lacks knowledge. In this sub-section of the article, I present a, kind of, fallback 
position. The idea is that even if I have not established that the agent does not know, the 
reasoning above makes it plausible that the agent might not know. If the agent might not know, 
that is sufficient to undermine the force of Lackey’s counterexamples, which, in turn, gives one 
good reason to think that she has not really established that KSA is false. 
Lackey has made a very bold claim. The problem is that bold claims need to be well 
established. Lackey is not unaware of the fact that she is endorsing a rather strong position. In 
order to falsify KSA Lackey needs to, in her words, establish “that there are various kinds of 
cases in which a speaker asserts that p, clearly knows that p, and yet does not have the proper 
epistemic authority or credentials to make such an assertion” (Lackey 2011, 253). The crux is 
that the speaker, or agent, asserting “clearly knows that p.” It could be argued that the above 
considerations do not establish that the speaker, or agent, in her counterexample clearly does not 
know that p. However, they certainly show that the speaker, or agent, does not clearly know that 
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p. Yet, clearly knowing that p is exactly what Lackey needs to draw the conclusion that she does. 
Therefore, the onus is on Lackey to do much more work to establish that it is clear that the agent 
has knowledge in the cases she describes. Until she has done that, there is little motivation to 
accept her conclusion. 
Another fallback position is to point out that Lackey’s counterexamples, especially 
DOCTOR, are too unrealistic to really have enough force to undermine a general norm of 
assertion, like KSA. At least intuitively, it does not seem reasonable that an expert oncologist, 
like Matilda, would base a cancer diagnosis solely on the testimony of a student, no matter how 
reliable the student might be. At least intuitively, it does not seem that Matilda would take 
herself to know that Derek has cancer, or at least know in the right way necessary for assertion, 
based simply on the word of her student. 
If Nancy were not a student, but rather another competent oncologist, perhaps Matilda 
would accept that as sufficient for knowing that Derek has cancer. However, then the intuition 
that Matilda lacks the epistemic right to assert is not so clear. On the other hand, if Nancy were 
another expert oncologist it does not seem that the scenario of DOCTOR, mutatis mutandis, 
would play out exactly the way Lackey describes. It seems reasonable to think that instead of flat 
out asserting to Derek that he has cancer, Matilda might add the preamble that her colleague had 
looked at Derek’s test results and had concluded that Derek had cancer, or she might bring 
Nancy in to meet with Derek as well. But, by adding the preamble or bringing Nancy with her to 
the meeting, which seems like at least something that Matilda might do, points to the fact that 
Matilda might not take herself to actually know that Derek has cancer, and hence might just be 
more evidence that it is not clear that Matilda knows.18 
                                                 
18 Actually, it is not unreasonable that Matilda might not do something like this even when Nancy is just a student. 
Instead of flat out asserting to Derek that he has pancreatic cancer, she would instead reschedule his appointment 
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Many of Lackey’s other counterexamples seem a bit unrealistic for the same type of 
reasons. Consider two others, PROFESSOR and FOOD. 
PROFESSOR: Judith is a professor at one of the best law schools in the country, 
and today’s lecture is on U.S. copyright law. While she is generally quite 
knowledgeable of this topic, she has failed to keep up with some recent 
developments in this area. Over lunch yesterday, one of her colleagues briefly 
expressed his belief that it is extremely improbable that the Supreme Court will 
consider a case challenging the addition of 20 years to the original copyright 
protection of 50 years after the death of authors. Though Judith does not know 
any of the reasons or considerations underlying this claim, she asserts to her 
students in class, “The Supreme Court is unlikely to hear the upcoming challenge 
to the recent extension of U.S. copyright protections to 70 years after the author’s 
death.” While this assertion is in fact true, it is based purely on the basis of the 
reliable testimony of Judith’s colleague (Lackey 2011, 254). 
 
FOOD: My neighbor Ken is a connoisseur of fine dining. As we were leaving 
Starbucks this afternoon, he told me that the food at a new local restaurant about 
which I was previously quite unfamiliar, Quince, is exquisite, though being in a 
hurry prevented him from offering any details or evidence on behalf of this claim. 
While talking to my friend Vivienne later in the day, she was fretting over where 
to take her boyfriend to dinner for Valentine’s Day. I promptly relieved her stress 
by truly asserting, “The food at Quince is exquisite” (Lackey 2011, 257). 
 
It seems that it is more realistic for the speakers in each of the cases to preface their assertion 
with something like “I have been told that…” or “According to…”, than for the speakers to just 
flat out assert what Lackey has them assert. If it is likely that the speakers would preface their 
assertion, then it seems reasonable to think that the speaker does not take themselves as clearly 
knowing the propositions under consideration. 
Here, I wanted to just draw attention to the fact that even if the arguments put forward in 
2.1-2, are not as convincing as I take them to be, they are still sufficient to undermine Lackey’s 
argument. Lackey needs it to be the case that the agent in her counterexamples clearly knows, 
                                                 
until she has looked at the test results, or preface the assertion with something like “It appears that …” and then add 
“… but I will need to review the results more carefully.” 
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but she has not demonstrated that the agent clearly knows. Since the agent does not clearly know, 
her conclusion does not follow; at least it does not follow in the right way to truly undermine 
KSA. I also drew attention to the fact that Lackey’s counterexamples, as presented, seem highly 
unrealistic. Making them more realistic seems to make the intuition that the agent in her 
counterexamples both has knowledge and the epistemic right to assert less clear, which is 
sufficient to undermine the force of her argument. 
 
3. What Lackey’s Argument Might Show 
Despite the fact that Lackey has failed to prove that KSA is false, her paper is instructive. 
What Lackey’s paper points to is the inadequacies of various epistemological theories. Before 
concluding, then, I will briefly discuss the positive upshot of Lackey’s paper. It will be suggested 
that what Lackey’s counterexamples demonstrate are problems with simplistic evidentialist and 
process reliabilist theories of knowledge. 
For evidentialism, knowledge is, roughly, simply justified true belief. Further, “S is 
justified in believing p at [time] t if and only if S’s evidence for p at t supports believing p” 
(Mittag 2020).19 What counts as “support” varies according to different theories of evidentialism, 
and can be context sensitive. Further, support, basically, amounts to something like the evidence 
makes it highly likely that p is true. Imagine, as Lackey does in responding to some objections, 
that Nancy and her testimony might be quite truth conducive. Here is the problem then for the 
evidentialist if Nancy’s testimony is extremely truth conducive, then Matilda is going to get 
knowledge. Yet, if what has been said above is right, then Matilda does not have knowledge. 
                                                 
19 Mittag’s Encyclopedia entry is used here for efficiency. For more complete accounts of evidentialism, see, for 
example, Conee and Feldman (2004). 
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Thus, Lackey has not shown that KSA is false, but that a straightforward evidentialism does not 
do justice to how one understands whether or not someone can know – at least not in all cases. 
The same type of argument can be made against a simplistic form of process reliabilism. 
According to process reliabilism, “S knows that p if and only if S believes that p, p is true, and 
S’s belief that p is formed by a reliable process” (Becker 2020).20 What counts as a reliable 
process can vary, but is, roughly, a process that is highly truth conducive. Therefore, if Nancy 
and her testimony are highly reliable, then Matilda will get knowledge based on Nancy’s 
testimony, but that is the wrong result. The problem is thus with process reliabilism, not KSA. 
What both evidentialism and process reliabilism have in common is their focus on truth-
conduciveness, and an implicit acceptance of knowledge being about simple propositions. 
Because of this – i.e. the focus on truth conduciveness and acceptance of knowledge being about 
simple propositions – evidentialism and reliabilism, at least simplistic forms of them, are not fine 
grained enough to notice that things like cancer diagnoses are more complex than a simple true 
or false proposition. The upshot is that something like a virtue theoretic account, whether a virtue 
reliabilism like Greco and Sosa or a virtue responsibilism like Zagzebski, has more theoretical 
power, and thus, is plausibly a superior epistemological theory. That, then, is what the real lesson 
of Lackey’s paper is. 
Now, if one did not find the arguments put forth in 2.1-2 to convincingly show that the 
agent in Lackey’s counterexamples lacked knowledge, then what has been said in this section 
might not be convincing either. On the other hand, what has been said in this section can still be 
instructive. At most, what Lackey has shown with her counterexamples is that KSA and 
simplistic evidentialist, or process reliabilist, epistemology, are at least prima facie incompatible, 
                                                 
20 As with Mittag (2020), Becker’s Encyclopedia entry is used here for the sake of efficiency. The literature on 
Reliabilism is vast, its foremost proponent being Goldman (1979), but see also Heller (1995), and Becker (2006). 
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or more strongly KSA is perhaps false only if one holds a simplistic evidentialist or process 
reliabilist epistemology. That in itself – KSA being perhaps false, conditionally – is telling 
against Lackey. Remember, Lackey needs it to be the case that the agent in her counterexample 
clearly does not know, but if her argument only works on certain assumptions about what counts 
as knowledge, then she has failed to make the case that KSA is actually false. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this article, I have argued that Jennifer Lackey has failed to prove that the KSA is 
false. According to the KSA, if a subject S knows that p, then S has the epistemic right to assert 
that p. Lackey’s argument proceeded by putting forth various counterexamples where it seemed, 
at least intuitively, that a subject both knew that p but lacked the epistemic right to assert that p, 
thereby falsifying KSA. It was shown that, in fact, the subject under consideration actually did 
not know. Since the subject lacked knowledge, the subject’s lack of an epistemic right to assert 
was not proof that KSA is false, but rather, perhaps, that KSA is true. The idea is that if the agent 
lacks the epistemic right to assert, then the agent fails to know, by Modus Tollens and KSA. 
However, at a minimum, it seems that Lackey is implicitly working with something that 
corresponds to KSA, or is perhaps stronger, where one can assert that p only if one knows that p. 
Since the subject in Lackey’s counterexample lacks the epistemic right to assert then the subject 
does not know; this seems to be the case because the reasons that Lackey gives for claiming the 
subject in her counterexamples does not have the epistemic right to assert are better understood 
as reasons for thinking the agent does not know. Notice that, even if Lackey is not relying on 
KSA, if the agent in the counterexample does not know then she has not falsified KSA. 
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To avoid the quagmire of intuition bumping, it was demonstrated that from a variety of 
perspectives, and for a variety of reasons, the agent in Lackey’s counterexamples does not know. 
First, it was shown that, for example, cancer diagnoses are complex and require special evidence. 
Second, it was shown that part of what distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief is the 
ability to make appropriate inferences. Then, it was shown that from the perspective of a virtue 
theoretic account of knowledge and Edward Craig’s practical explication of knowledge the agent 
in the counterexamples lacks knowledge. 
Finally, it was concluded that although Lackey failed to successfully prove that KSA is 
false, there were some valuable lessons. It was suggested that a simplistic evidentialism and 
process reliabilism, are theoretically less powerful than a virtue epistemology. Thus, what 
Lackey truly gives in her paper is a prima facie argument in favor of, perhaps, something like a 
virtue epistemology.  
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